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ABSTRACT: The ability to handle maritime operations is increasingly dependent on control systems. Such systems 
play a crucial role in critical situations, by presenting safety-critical information that allows operators to make sense 
of the situation, i.e. sensemaking. Rules and regulations influence design of the systems and training, both key areas 
impacting safety. This paper is based on regulations in Norway related to design, operation and training of maritime 
operations involving dynamic positioning (DP) and navigation systems used on the bridge. We have explored 
accident reports, observed work, performed literature review and interviewed actors (regulators, designers, 
seafarers, and certification agencies) to get a sound basis for our suggestions. We find that rules are improving 
slowly and that there is little focus on Human Factors (HF) design from basic ergonomics through support of 
cognition. Totality of rules has not been adopted to support sensemaking. Technology driven implementation may 
not support critical tasks and the users can be subjected to stress, poor sensemaking and conditions leading to 
accidents. Our suggestion is to support functional regulation, focus on HF from design, use critical "safety-cases" 
and verify training periodically. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background and challenges 
The level of maritime accidents has seen a 
significant reduction in the last century – however 
looking at the last period some discrepancies are 
seen. International statistics from the period 2000-
2012 show that fatalities per ship year, i.e. 
frequency of loss of life has been reduced. 
However, frequencies related to the occurrence of 
serious accidents show increased values of about 
30% (Eleftheria et al. 2016). This trend is also 
present in Norway, in the period 2004-2014, 
personal injuries have decreased considerably, but 
frequency of ship accidents have increased 
Norwegian Maritime Authority, 2015). 
This paper aims to understand how the risks of 
these ship accidents can be reduced. When 
discussing risk reduction, we base our scope on 
Lund and Aarø (2004), i.e. that risk reduction 
must be based on a broad set of actions – 
including regulation, technical design, training 
and awareness of the situation (i.e. the result of a 
sensemaking process). 
One development in the maritime sector has 
been that automation, systems and alarms are 
increasing on the ship bridge. This is increasing 
the burden on human actors that must make sense 
of what is happening during normal and safety-
critical situations. Increased automation may 
reduce the workload but creates an "out of the 
loop" environment, removing the operator from 
direct control as automation takes more control. 
When automation fails during complex situations 
the operator may not understand the situation, i.e. 
having a situation of poor sensemaking being "out 
of the loop". We are interested in exploring 
whether the design of computer-based control 
systems influences the level of accidents. In order 
to understand and improve the handling of safety-
critical situations, there is a need to address both 
the design of safety-critical systems and the 
training to enable operators to deal with the 
unexpected. None of these issues can be 
understood in isolation from human, 
technological or organisational context of which 
they are part, such as regulations and Human 
Factors (HF). The science of HF is an important 
foundation for understanding operations and 
critical tasks. HF consist of ergonomics 
(workplace layout, working postures); cognitive 
issues (mental workload, decision, information 
systems, task analysis) and organisational issues 
(communication, effective teams/Crew Resource 
Management, work processes). 
The establishment of rules and regulation is a 
challenge due to the international characteristic of 
the maritime industry, and the strong focus on 
self-regulation and cost-optimization. Too strong 
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regulation in one country may drive costs and may 
influence shipping to move to another flag-state – 
thus there is a need for positive influences such as 
knowledge, collaboration, and benefits such as 
safety. Our focus on rules and regulations are 
based on a safety perspective, i.e.: 
• The need to formulate industry good practice 
as rules, in order to force laggards into line; 
• The need to formulate rules in order to raise 
the standards higher; 
• The need to formulate rules when the 
consequences of failures are significant. 
The analysis and future mitigation of an 
accident is based on models used to analyse 
accidents. The models will determine the 
perspective of the accident analysis and guide the 
conclusions, as described in "What-You-Look-
For-Is-What-You-Find" in Lundberg et al. (2009). 
In the maritime sector the accident reports, (from 
Marine Accident Investigation Branch – MAIB) 
are often based on Reason’s "Swiss Cheese" 
model of accident causation (Reason 1997). This 
model includes some technical and organisational 
issues – but does not include a full focus on the 
design phase or human factors, as in HFACS – the 
Human Factor Analysis and Classification 
System as described by Reinach and Viale (2006). 
This may lead to using the old concept of "human 
errors" as a root cause, see Allianz (2018), and not 
analysing the incident with a modern system 
perspective. In Allianz (2018) it is stated that 
more than 75% of marine accidents can be 
attributed to "human error". We use the system 
perspective, i.e. that "human error", is a symptom 
of trouble deeper inside the system (Dekker 2001, 
2002). To understand failures, you must study 
features of people's tools, task and operating 
environment, as well as understand and learn from 
successes and recoveries. The theory of HRO - 
High Reliability Organisations (Rochlin, 1996; 
Roberts, 1989) argues that high reliability and 
avoidance of errors is an organisational trait, thus 
human error is a symptom of organisational 
issues. We argue that accidents and successful 
operations are impacted by organisational issues, 
and by designing and implementing systems that 
supports the user. Thus, we support the view that 
"human error" is a result and not the root cause of 
accidents.  
1.2 Definitions and terminology 
We use the term safety-critical to denote 
situations or operations that, if they go wrong, 
have a large potential for causing harm to people, 
property or environment. Critical operations on 
the bridge include voyage planning, navigation, 
positioning and manoeuvring the ship during the 
voyage. Key systems used on the bridge are DP 
systems and navigation systems. 
We base this discussion on sensemaking as "a 
process, prompted by violated expectations, that 
involves attending to and bracketing cues in the 
environment, creating intersubjective meaning 
through cycles of interpretation and action, and 
thereby enacting a more ordered environment 
from which further cues can be drawn" from 
Maitlis and Christianson (2014). The pragmatic 
approach is to look upon sensemaking as a 
dynamic process loop of observing, orienting, and 
acting. This process is on-going in a social setting 
creating and supporting understanding. It is both 
a retrospective and a prospective process, 
supporting understanding and supporting how to 
build and adopt resilience (i.e. ability to handle 
unanticipated situations) through future actions. 
Safety is related to accidental harm, while 
security is related to intentional harm. Safety is 
defined as: "the degree to which accidental harm 
is prevented, reduced and properly reacted to" 
(Firesmith 2003). 
The concept of resilience engineering is an 
important strategy to handle unanticipated 
incidents. Hollnagel, Woods and Leveson (2006) 
define resilience as "the intrinsic ability of a 
system to adjust its functioning prior to or 
following changes and disturbances, so that it can 
sustain operations even after a major mishap or in 
the presence of continuous stress". Handling of 
unanticipated incidents and continue to operate 
safe is a key ability when automation is 
increasing. 
1.3 Key regulations 
Regulation impacts design of control systems and 
the bridge is based on a hierarchy of regulations 
from the International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), flag state regulations, guidelines from 
classifications societies, industry guidelines and 
company specific guidelines. 
The IMO conventions such as SOLAS (The 
International Convention For The Safety of Life 
At Sea – supports sensemaking. As an example 
chapter V-15 – Principles relating to bridge de-
sign, design and arrangement of navigational 
systems and equipment and bridge procedures, 
specifies: "the design and arrangement of 
navigational systems and equipment on the bridge 
and bridge procedures shall be taken with the aim 
of facilitating the tasks to be performed by the 
bridge team and the pilot in making full appraisal 
of the situation and in navigating the ship safely 
under all operational conditions" – however the 
process to reach this goal is not clearly described. 
There is a set of specifications related to bridge 
equipment such as IEC 62288 – " Maritime 
navigation …" but no system view, and lack of 
integrated standards covering bridge systems and 
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navigation systems. A HF-based standard such as 
ISO 9241-210:2010 "Ergonomics of human-
system interaction…" are not so often referenced 
or used. Relevant DP guideline has been updated 
in 2017, IMO - Circ.1580 (2017), specifying 
requirements for DP system redundancy and 
levels. Other key industrial standards are the 
training standards – such as IMO's International 
Convention on Standards of Training, 
Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 
(STCW), latest version from 2010. 
1.4 Scope and Research Questions 
The key challenge has been to explore maritime 
accidents related to electronic bridge systems and 
DP systems. The theme of this paper is to discuss 
conditions that impact sensemaking and through 
the sensemaking, the necessary human actions in 
a safety-critical situation. Three areas supporting 
sensemaking has been selected: design, 
rules/regulations and training. Based on the 
preceding introduction, the research questions 
(RQ) we want to explore are: 
• RQ1: What is the relationship between design 
and accidents, i.e. is (poor) design a 
significant contribution to accidents? 
• RQ2: What are the causes of accidents 
involving control systems used in critical 
operations – that can be mitigated by design 
or training? 
• RQ3: What improvements should be 
suggested to rules and regulations in order to 
support sensemaking in safety critical 
maritime operations  
 
2. Methodology and approach 
We have based this paper on several sources 
including interviews, a review of selected accident 
reports, and a focused literature review described in 
the following. 
We have performed interviews with actors in the 
maritime sector, to cover the activities from 
specification of ship/ship design through training 
and operations. Thus, we have included decision 
makers, designers, researchers, users and regulators 
to discuss relationship between rules/regulations, 
design, sensemaking, and training. 
We have performed a limited literature review of 
the relationship between poor design and accidents. 
The literature review based on a keyword search of 
"design causes of accidents in maritime sector" 
using Web of Science, SCOPUS and Google 
Scholar (limited). In addition, we have reviewed 
papers focused on DP accidents through a keyword 
search using dynamic positioning and 
accidents/incidents in the search. 
We have reviewed accident reports to identify 
root causes, especially related to loss of situational 
awareness (i.e. poor sensemaking process), poor 
design, poor training, poor ability to handle the 
unexpected – and if these root causes may be 
mitigated by improving rules and regulations. To 
focus our review on systems used by people we have 
selected accidents that involved onboard control 
systems, i.e. accidents which were supposedly 
involving onboard electronics in some shape or 
form. We have selected 19 accident reports in 
collaboration with an expert within the area of 
maritime safety. The review included 14 Marine 
Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) 
investigation reports from accident occurring in the 
period 2005 – 2016 as well as 5 other investigation 
reports from accidents occurring in the period 1995 
– 2008. We performed the review focusing on "loss 
of situational awareness/ poor sensemaking", "poor 
ability to handle the unexpected" and "poor design". 
3. Results and discussions 
In the following section, we have documented the 
findings from the literature review, from the analysis 
of accidents reports and the results from the 
interviews. 
3.1 Findings from literature review 
Searching for literature on design causes of 
accidents in the maritime sector, we found 
(Mišković et al. 2018) in addition to Rothblum 
(2000), Chauvin et al (2013) and Dong et al. (2017). 
In addition, we found a general article discussing the 
contribution of design to accidents, Kinnersley et al. 
(2007). Ibid are discussing the proportion of 
accidents that have their root causes in design. Based 
on a review of accidents in aviation and nuclear 
industry they conclude that approximately 50% of 
all accidents have root causes in design. No analysis 
of the maritime industry was performed, but poor 
equipment design was cited as a causal factor in one 
third of marine causalities (Wagenaar et al. 1987). In 
general, it is seen that poor design is a significant 
cause of accidents.  
Mišković et al. (2018), mention that poor design 
was a root cause of adverse situations and prolonged 
the time of the seafarers to familiarize themselves 
with the systems, in an environment with shorter 
handover times. There were differences in settings 
and interfaces between different manufacturers. 
Inadequate HMI (Human Machine Interfaces) has 
been identified as one of the factors contributing to 
adverse situations. Design can negatively impact 
situation awareness, voyage plan monitoring, 
workload and stress. More automation detaches the 
seafarer from the control process, i.e. "out-of-the-
loop" and leads to increased cognitive demands. 
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In Rothblum (2000), the main HF challenges 
were listed as fatigue, inadequate communication, 
inadequate general technical knowledge, inadequate 
knowledge of own ship systems and poor design of 
automation (i.e. poor design pervades almost all 
shipboard automation leading to accidents such as 
collisions). It was suggested that these challenges 
could be mitigated by human-centred design. 
Chauvin et al. (2013) analysed 27 collisions at 
sea, in 1998 to 2012, using HFACS, to focus on 
human and organisational factors. The accident 
reports focused on the immediate events i.e. unsafe 
acts and preconditions for unsafe acts such as 
visibility, condition of operators, misuse of 
instruments – and poor reflection on framework 
conditions such as unsafe leadership; organisational 
influences; and outside factors (e.g. regulation, 
design). Key findings were that unsafe acts were 
mainly related to decision-making (85%) and from 
preconditions, poor visibility and misuse of 
instruments as the main environmental factors. In 
the same line, MAIB (2004) pointed out improper or 
poor use of radar in collision since it appeared in 
73% of the cases being investigated. Related to the 
operators, poor situational awareness and deficit in 
attention appear to be major elements – i.e. poor 
situational awareness is often the precursor of poor 
decisions. 
Focusing the literature search on DP systems, we 
found several articles. However, not many were 
directly related to the topics of interest for our paper 
(i.e. design issues, training and regulation).  
The Norwegian regulator i.e. the petroleum 
safety authority (Kvitrud et al. 2012) explored 
control systems such as DP and found that there 
was a high level of incidents related to positioning 
and DP, needing to prioritise initiatives in the 
industry and from the regulator. The paper 
suggested that high attention should be given to 
ensure well designed and tested systems in 
addition to supporting a good safety culture, 
competence and training. Related to regulations 
the authorities have asked that the guidelines 
NORSOK N003 (2007), discussing structural 
design, and DNV-OS-A101 (2010), discussing 
requirements for design and alarms; should be 
reviewed and improved. 
In Olubitan et al. (2018), the summarized 
incidents from IMCA (International Marine 
Contractors Association) and found that the major 
cause of DP incidents were the failure of thruster 
systems, creating the need for training of failures. 
In Dong et al. (2017) the authors performed an 
analysis of dynamic positioning system accidents 
based on 9 accident reports from the period 2000-
2015. The three main risk influencing factors 
mentioned in the reports were Shuttle Tanker 
positioning/ control system, organisation of work (as 
procedures, training) and crew competence. Key 
root causes of the accidents/incidents related to 
design/planning were: Deficiencies in DP software 
design; poor ergonomics/deficiency in design (poor 
man machine interfaces – important information 
was given on different monitors) deficiency in 
design (insufficient alarms; and massive alarms on 
many monitors and panels located at a large area). 
There have been few papers focusing the 
relationship between poor design and accidents in 
the maritime sector, even though poor HF based 
design is mentioned as a contributor to accidents, 
such as missing information "at-a-glance" and poor 
alarm strategy. However, the papers point out that 
poor design is a significant cause of accidents. 
An additional search for research literature on 
rules and regulations related to either design of 
safety critical systems or training for the use of such 
systems left us with no relevant publications. 
3.2 Findings from interviews 
We have performed interviews among regulators, 
designers (HF experts), suppliers and seafarers. Key 
issues that can be drawn from the discussions with 
the interviewees include: 
• HF experts are seldom involved early in the 
design phase. Key HF principles may be 
missing in design; thus impacting ergonomics, 
cognitive issues (situational understanding) and 
organisational issues. Even simple ergonomics 
issues (such as work posture) may be poorly 
designed and handled. 
• The principle of "user driven design" is not 
often used – decisions are being made between 
a network of actors not sufficiently involved in 
the actual operations of ships. Suggested ideal 
processes would ensure that decision makers 
base their request for proposal on user needs 
and focus on safety and resilience. Design of 
screens and information are seldom based on 
user driven design. As an example, 
visualisations are often based on presentation of 
digits and not on trend presentations; thus, 
information may not be grasped "at a glance". 
• It takes a substantial time from problems 
uncovered trough accident investigations are 
resolved in rules and regulation (i.e. 6-10 years) 
both internationally and nationally. 
• The alarm systems are often poorly designed, 
and the systems may be subject to alarm 
flooding, i.e. the alarm philosophy is often 
missing. Regulation may demand that alarms 
are annunciate even though this may reduce the 
sensemaking process of the operators. 
• Accident analyses are focused on "human 
errors" and not based on a system perspective 
taking into consideration poor design, missing 
rules and regulations. Thus, human error may 
be seen as a cause and not as a consequence of 
poor conditions such as poor design of system, 
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missing focus of HF and poor alarm design. HF 
experts are part of all marine accident 
investigations from day one in Sweden, but not 
in Norway. 
• There is a need for more training of critical 
failures, such as loss of DP. Not all can handle 
the ship when DP fails. It was pointed out that 
training in the Norwegian sector should be 
validated periodically in a three-year cycle as in 
the UK sector, to ensure that all operators can 
handle critical operations. 
• Checklists in the maritime sector have been 
improved by using best practices from aviation. 
The safety level in aviation is seen as 
impressive, there is a lot to learn from aviation 
in the maritime industry, as has been done by 
adoption of CRM. It should be an increased 
focus on learning best practices from aviation. 
Main findings are the missing HF focus with use 
of appropriate standards, missing focus on human 
centred design and missing validation of training. 
3.3 Findings from analysis of accident reports 
This section describes the results from the review of 
19 accident investigation reports. We wanted to 
focus on sensemaking, resilience, safety critical 
operations, training and user interfaces. Key issues 
in critical operations were passage planning, 
navigation and alarms. When discussing user 
interfaces (HMI) the issues were related to the use of 
actual electronic systems such as Electronic Chart 
Display and Information System (ECDIS), 
Electronic Chart System (ECD), DP and other 
systems. The results are presented, with reference to 
#id of accident report, the following themes sorted 
by number of references: 
a) Loss of situation awareness/sensemaking  (10) 
b) Poor resilience/redundancy   (9) 
c) Alarm related issues   (9) 
d) Insufficient training    (8) 
e) Lacking or insufficient passage planning (7) 
f) Poor or missing work load assessment  (6) 
g) Poor (safety) management  (5) 
h) Missing or unclear regulations/standards (5) 
i) Poor system design or display layout  (2) 
j) Poor bridge layout   (1) 
These categories are not mutually exclusive. 
Thus, some of the identified safety issues can for 
example describe both poor resilience and poor 
system design. 
Loss of situational awareness due to poor 
monitoring of position; influence of alcohol; 
distraction due to workload; unsafe navigation 
practices; poor passage planning; insufficient 
understanding of control system; misinterpretation 
of the nature of malfunctions. (In #2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 14, 
16, 17, 19). (Sensemaking not used explicit.) 
Poor resilience in terms of poor organisational 
redundancy of coastguard; poor backup of 
equipment; no contingency planning; poor route 
planning not cross-checked; undue reliance on the 
ECDIS; practice of operating with watertight doors 
open; not using at least two independent sources to 
verify position; no installed navigation autopilot 
with alarm when discrepancies were detected. In 
summary, there is a need to establish resilience in 
critical operations such as planning and navigation. 
(In #9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19). 
Alarm related issues including disabling of 
alarms and thus removing necessary barriers of 
imminent danger; alarm system silenced, missing 
entering of passage plan into the ECS; ECDIS not 
utilized effectively as navigation aid and audible 
alarm disabled; ECDIS safety setting not appropriate 
– audible alarm inoperative – defect of alarm system 
not being reported; system giving alarm per minute 
and over-whelming the watchkeeper; poor 
understanding of the system and relationship of 
alarms; navigation equipment ineffective and not 
set-up to use all safety features; no installation of 
alarm comparing position from multiple 
independent positions. In summary, alarm design is 
a key issue, and there is a need to establish best 
practices of alarms either through regulation or 
industry wide standards. (In #1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 13, 14, 
15, 16, 18). 
Insufficient training in terms of no emergency 
preparedness training; operator not qualified and not 
supervised; untrained in the use of the ECS and 
unaware of user support; no training in use of 
ECDIS and no safety procedures established; 
ECDIS training and competence should be part of 
the STCW code; marked differences in ECDIS 
systems such as menus, terminology and interfaces; 
poor training of electronic support systems/main 
engine control systems; poor training in use of the 
integrated navigation system; poor training in Crew 
Resource Management and emergency 
communication; poor focus on continuous 
professional development and skill retainment. In 
summary, poor training seems to be a key issue in 
many accidents using electronic systems (ECDIS, 
voyage management system, etc.). Both improved 
design and training is needed, appropriate to the 
equipment in use by regulation or industry-wide 
standards (such as the STCW code). The accident 
reports raise the issue of usability and user 
involvement from design through acceptance of 
these electronic systems – are the systems so poorly 
made that they are a challenge to use? (In #1, 2, 4, 7, 
8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19). 
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Lacking or insufficient passage planning 
including poor passage planning and poor checking 
and approval of the route (i.e. grounding was 
inevitable due to vessel draught and depth of water); 
poor utilization of ECS or ECDIS for passage 
planning – the system would have given alarms 
early, and plan not cross checked by the master. In 
summary, the quality of planning is a key issue and 
the support from the ECDIS are often missing (either 
due to poor training or poor design). (In #1, 3, 4, 6, 
8, 9, 11, 12). 
Poor or missing work load assessment in terms 
of the chief leaving the bridge due to fatigue; the sole 
bridge watch-keeper having to undertake passage 
planning and chart corrections and bridge manning 
was insufficient; the Coastguard being distracted 
and did not send warning due to chronic manpower 
shortages; the bridge team having to provide 
administrative information when they should focus 
on safety of vessel passage; the bridge missing an 
appropriately certified third person; a widespread 
deselection of automated functions in ECDIS to 
reduce workload (indicative of wider problems with 
the ECDIS design); In summary, organisational 
factors as well as design issues contribute to work 
load and fatigue.  (In #1, 5, 8, 9, 11, 16, 18, 19). 
Poor (safety) management including the 
Harbour not having a risk assessment or safety 
management plan in the pilotage area; the crew 
seeing no value in safety management; the master 
providing insufficient safety focus/culture; poor 
clarity in responsibility during watch; inefficient 
safety audits based on ISM code; poor risk 
assessment prior to work on ballasting; poor passage 
planning – not cross-checked – and mitigating 
actions not performed. In summary, risk-based focus 
of operations is sometimes missing – and there is 
variability.  (In #1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 
18, 19). 
Missing or unclear regulations/standards 
related to needed understanding of equipment and 
usage relating to electronic chart displays; need for 
training of ECDIS and voyage management systems 
not set out; absence of regulatory and industry-wide 
standards for training appropriate to the equipment 
the operators use; need for performance standards 
for integrated bridge systems i.e. design, installation 
and testing. In summary, there is a need for 
improved regulation and standards related to use of 
integrated bridge systems and ECDIS. (In #1, 7, 10, 
13, 15, 16, 18). 
Poor system design or display layout in terms 
of deficiencies in design and implementation of the 
integrated bridge system and in the procedures for its 
operation; widespread de-selection of automated 
functions in ECDIS that is indicative of wider 
problems with ECDIS; ECDIS not used as expected 
by the regulators or equipment manufacturer; 
ECDIS safeguards intended to prevent grounding 
were overlooked, disabled or ignored; MAIB chief 
inspector said: "this is the third grounding 
investigated by the MAIB where watchkeepers’ 
failure to use ECDIS properly has been identified as 
one of the causal factors. In 2014 there are over 30 
manufacturers of ECDIS equipment, each with their 
own designs of user inter-face, and little evidence 
that a common approach is developing." In 
summary, there is a need for standardization, 
improved user-based design, and user-based 
acceptance testing in normal operations and during 
critical operations. (In #1, 4, 8, 9, 10, 13, 17, 18). 
Poor bridge layout with layout of the central 
bridge console preventing the chief officer from 
utilizing the ECDIS to support the master during 
pilotage; In summary, bridge design must be 
improved and based on task analyses. (In #4, 11). 
We have been interested in the relationship 
between poor sensemaking, resilience and poor 
design. We see resilience as an ability in 
sensemaking, to improvise and use existing systems 
and resources to cope with novel situations, i.e. use 
redundant or alternative systems (or check 
perception with other stakeholders) and thus reduce 
consequences of an unwanted situation. Looking at 
situations with both loss of situational awareness/ 
poor sensemaking and poor resilience – we observe 
from five accident reports (#9, 14, 16, 17, 19) that 
poor sensemaking lead to dangerous situations and 
the additional poor resilience does not hinder or 
reduce the consequences of the situation. Thus, the 
dangerous situation develops into an accident. 
When focusing on sensemaking, the usability 
qualities of the control systems (ECDIS, Bridge 
systems, DPS) should improve. The poor usability 
also influences the needed training regime, since 
training and competence development seems 
challenging (due to system complexity) and 
sometimes missing (due to costs, poor practice and 
missing regulation of training). The ability to 
understand the status at a glance (and get an 
understanding of key risks) may be missing. Passage 
planning seems poor due to poor usability and 
missing operational procedures – thus the systems 
do not support sensemaking as they should. The 
alarm systems have not been adapted to the users' 
workload and system understanding, thus alarms 
seem a disturbance and not an input to improved 
sensemaking. 
Design of organisational procedures and work 
should be performed together with the seafarers to 
ensure usability of procedures, checklists; clarity in 
responsibility and proper work load. Too high work 
load may lead to stress and challenges sensemaking 
and understanding. Design of alarms should be 
performed to ensure that alarms are designed to 
support sensemaking and not stress the operators 
with too many alarms i.e. more than six alarms each 
hour as specified by EEMUA-191 (2013).  
4. Discussion and conclusion 
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Based on our findings and the existing frame-
conditions in the industry, the overall focus of 
regulation must be based on increased knowledge 
sharing and learning from accidents and mitigating 
actions between the regulators, the ship owners, key 
stakeholders (insurers and certification companies) 
and the workforce. The findings support the 
following suggestions: 
• Increased regulators’ and industry focus on 
user centric design principles: Poor design is 
a significant contributor to maritime accidents. 
There is a need for improved regulations and 
standards related to use of integrated bridge 
systems and ECDIS. Design of bridges and 
control systems should be based on user centric 
design principles, involvement from HF experts 
and should be subject of inspections, regulators 
and workforce attention. Benefits of user 
centric design should be highlighted trough 
research. 
• Alarm philosophy must be established for all 
systems – not individually for each system. The 
quality of alarm systems is poor and alarm 
guidelines and standards should be established 
based on industry best practices considering 
human limitations. Collaboration between 
regulators, industry and classification society 
should be prioritized to speed up adaption. 
• Increased regulators' focus on training 
including verification: Training in use of 
safety critical systems should be subject to 
increased regulation, and verification of 
knowledge should be performed periodically 
(each 3rd year) based on safety cases. Training 
should be based on safety events challenging 
the operator – such loss of DP systems and 
speed of ability to recover/ get "in-the-loop". 
• A contemporary system perspective should 
be used in maritime accident analysis – 
changing the perception of the old fashioned 
"human error" from a cause to a more 
systematic assessment of other root causes 
found to be significant contributors to accidents 
- such as poor design, poor training and poor 
procedures. Quality of accident investigations 
should be improved, in addition to improve 
information sharing and learning. Assessment 
of design and HF-design as a contributor to 
accidents should be a part of accident analyses. 
An HF expert should be part of all accident 
investigations from day one as practiced in 
Sweden, but currently not in Norway. 
• Continue to adopt best practices from the 
aviation Industry. Shipping has adopted many 
best practices from the aviation industry such as 
Crew Resource Management/ Bridge Resource 
Management, procedures to make checklists 
usable – this is a practice that should continue. 
As a further example – more standardization is 
needed – such as in bridge systems/ECDIS 
equipment. 
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